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ABSTRACT 
The role of “empathy” haunts recent debates about how judges 
make decisions. Remarkably, however, the intellectual origins of 
scholarly resistance to empathic judging remain poorly understood. 
This Article fills that gap. Through historical and theoretical study, it 
reveals the ways in which the modern anti-emphatic consensus can 
be seen as a mutated descendent of late-nineteenth century 
formalism. This Article also marks an irony with significant 
implications for the empathy debate: Although the anti-empathic 
view was born of formalism, it has drifted from its source such that it 
would almost certainly be condemned by the very formalist scholars 
from whom it is descended. Modern critiques of judicial empathy 
liberate themselves from an important limitation imposed by those 
prior theories—they believe that their proposed methods can be 
applicable beyond the realm of private law, and into public law—but 
if this is impossible, then these theories have nothing to say about the 
area in which they are so often employed: constitutional 
interpretation.
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court confirmation hearings have sparked a renewed 
interest in the “proper role” of a judge and of adjudication generally. 
The topic took on an exaggerated place in the Roberts and 
Sotomayor hearings, and is likely to be center stage in those coming 
up in the near future.1 While this debate has always pervaded both 
public and theoretical discussions, many have noticed that recent 
instantiations seem skewed in favor of one side—one vision of 
adjudication has emerged as appropriate and acceptable, with its 
purported opposite disfavored and maligned by all but liberal legal 
academics. The publicly acceptable view is that of a judge who uses 
reason alone to reach a decision, and who plays by the established 
rules (which are themselves easy to discern). The alternative, now 
seemingly anathema, is the judge who supplements reason with 
experience and affective (i.e., non-cognitive, emotional) capacities—
especially empathy. This new climate of opinion has been called “the 
anti-empathic turn.”2 
In response, recent scholarship seeks to situate this shift within 
the larger trends that have taken place in legal theory over the past 
century. Specifically, Robin West argues that the anti-empathic turn 
is the intellectual progeny of an element of thinking advanced by the 
“Legal Realists”: 
The paradigm shift I’ll describe represents a culmination, or vindication, 
of Justice Holmes’s audacious claim . . . near the beginning of the century 
just closed, that the common-law lawyer and common-law judge of the 
future–that would be us, now–would be the masters of economics, 
                                                 
 1. See generally Thomas B. Colby, In Defense of Judicial Empathy, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 1944 (2012). 
 2. Robin West, The Anti-Empathic Turn, in NOMOS LIII: PASSIONS AND 
EMOTIONS 243-88 (James E. Fleming ed., 2013). 
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statistics, and the slide rule, rather than the masters of Blackstone or black-
letter law.3 
Adjudication based on social science was objective, replacing 
the moralizing of prior theories—this, of course, leaves no room for 
empathy or any similarly “subjective” considerations. As West 
writes, 
[I]t’s worth identifying just three of the “signposts along the road” 
originating either in law or sister disciplines. The first was a development 
in American legal theory . . . . 
In the first three decades of the past century, “legal realists” famously 
rebelled against the then traditional paradigm of moralistic judging, as 
well as the “brooding omnipresence in the sky” that informed it, by which 
they meant the common law in general and Langdellian pretenses of the 
common law’s autonomy and “completeness” in particular.4 
Investigating the intellectual genealogy of the anti-empathic 
consensus is a useful endeavor, and helps us to better understand its 
theoretical foundations. Still, we should look back further than Legal 
Realism if we want to see the ultimate progenitor of the anti-empathy 
theory—back to what we now call classical legal orthodoxy. West 
points us to the movement that rebelled against this “Langdellian” 
orthodoxy, but it is the orthodoxy itself that provides a firmer basis 
for comparison. Because both Langdellianism and the anti-empathic 
consensus posit that the law is complete, determinate, autonomous, 
apolitical, and derivable and applicable through formal reason, it is 
accurate to describe the anti-empathic consensus as neo-orthodox 
legal thought. However, this neo-orthodoxy abandons or ignores an 
important limitation of its ancestor: It aspires to be applicable to the 
realm of public law, an area where Langdell and his followers 
thought that scientific adjudication was impossible. Thus, the 
genealogy must be supplemented, but admittedly, this 
supplementation cannot account for everything.  
Part II will briefly describe the debate about judicial empathy, 
with Part III laying out the reconstructed (and supplemented) 
argument against it. Part IV will do the same with classical legal 
orthodoxy, and Part V will compare and contrast the two intellectual 
movements. Overall, I conclude that the anti-empathy position is best 
described as neo-orthodoxy, but that its salient difference—the focus 
on public law—makes it a mutation that would be unrecognizable 
and unacceptable to the older orthodox theory. Because the debate 
                                                 
 3. Id. at 249. 
 4. Id. at 274. 
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about the role of empathy in adjudication is likely to resurface very 
soon in the impending confirmation hearings of any new Supreme 
Court justice, we would do well to recall the intellectual progenitors 
of each opposing camp, and take note of long recognized weaknesses 
(or strengths) in any older theories. To understand the debate, we 
should understand its context. 
II. BACKGROUND & CLARIFICATION 
Because there has been a great deal written on the judicial 
empathy debate, I will not revisit its history in great detail. Suffice it 
to say, statements made by President Obama regarding Supreme 
Court nominations led to the issue of “empathy” taking on symbolic 
importance during confirmation hearings, with nominees espousing 
views of proper adjudication and the public weighing in.5 However, 
what emerged in response was somewhat of a consensus: The judges 
themselves, the senators, and the public all turned against empathic 
judging, and looked instead towards the “umpire” model advanced 
by Chief Justice Roberts.6 Various intellectuals also engaged in the 
debate, siding with this popular consensus. These groups defined 
empathy as an emotional connection with certain types of people or 
ideas; it was what others call “sympathy” or “selective empathy.”7 
In response, the legal academy developed its own, but opposite 
consensus: Empathic judging is neither deleterious nor is it some 
new “liberal” innovation. Instead, the nature of adjudication makes it 
such that empathy is both necessary and salutary (for various 
reasons),8 and empathy properly understood is an affective faculty 
                                                 
 5. For an excellent summary of the entire saga, see Colby, supra note 1, at 
1945-58.
 6. Id. at 1947-49. 
7. See John Hasnas, The ‘Unseen’ Deserve Empathy, Too, WALL ST. J., 
May 29, 2009, at A15. The terms “selective empathy” and “sympathy” are usually 
employed by pro-empathy thinkers hoping to differentiate their claims from these 
other concepts (that are the source of Hasnas’s worries). See, e.g., West, supra note 
2, at 248-49. 
 8. Although articles like this proliferate, the most notable and rigorous are 
the following: Susan A. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 
1 (2011); Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009 
CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 133 (2009); Colby, supra note 1; Lynne N. Henderson, 
Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574 (1987); West, supra note 2. These 
thinkers show (persuasively) that many legal doctrines clearly require that the 
adjudicator imagine what the litigant’s position must be like, and that this produces 
more just outcomes. Empathic adjudication is thus descriptively true as an account 
of the type of adjudication that the law demands, but is also normatively valuable. 
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that enables one to better understand any other person, idea, or 
position.9 Thus, this faculty is not spring-loaded in favor of any one 
litigant, but is neutral. One influential formulation of this type of 
empathy—and the definition that will be applied throughout this 
paper—is put forward by Lynne Henderson: Empathy is 
“understanding the experience or situation of another, both 
affectively and cognitively, often achieved by imagining oneself to 
be in the position of the other.”10 
Comparing this avowedly neutral definition with the 
“sympathy” conception utilized by empathy-detractors, we might 
think that this entire debate is but a definitional misunderstanding. 
Some have suggested this,11 but I find that this too easily dodges the 
central question at issue. Even if we take the broader, more neutral 
definition of empathy, the anti-empathic thinkers discussed below 
would still reject it. For them, proper adjudication cannot admit of 
any affective influences, even when acting as supplements or 
complements to the cognitive faculties, and even when purportedly 
neutral. For the anti-empathic thinkers, the affective—the 
emotional—inherently skews decision-making. For them, neutral, 
nonselective empathy is impossible. Because of this, we cannot so 
easily escape the dichotomy posed by the debate; it must be 
confronted head on, as a fundamental disagreement about the 
legitimacy of utilizing affective faculties in adjudication. 
III. THE ANTI-EMPATHY ARGUMENT 
I will begin by constructing and supplementing the argument 
against judicial empathy. In doing so, I draw on a variety of sources. 
These include opinion pieces from prominent thinkers, as well as 
some law review articles and older books. While it may be that those 
who oppose empathy do not have one monolithic view, there is 
generally a strong similarity, and an amalgamation will be 
substantially faithful to each individual. It is helpful to state up front 
the conclusion that will eventually be reached by this explication: 
Adjudication ought only involve the application of cognitive 
faculties (especially reason, logic, etc.), and the implementation of 
affective faculties in the endeavor is illicit. How does one arrive 
here? As we will see, the conclusion flows from higher order 
                                                 
9. See generally Hasnas, supra note 7. 
 10. Henderson, supra note 8, at 1579. 
 11. See, e.g., Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, supra note 8. 
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commitments about the function of law (and politics), as well as the 
“rule of law” and the advantages it is expected to bring. 
A. Law and Politics 
The anti-empathic turn begins with the notion that the function
or point of law itself is social stability, settlement, and predictability. 
The idea goes something like this: Without authority (and its 
instrument or manifestation, law) cooperative living is impossible. 
We need predetermined rules so that we can coordinate our actions, 
settle on certain basic terms or arrangements, and minimize the costs 
of nonlegal forms of social ordering. 
This deeper justification is most fully addressed in anti-
empathic thinking by Judge J. Harvie Wilkinson.12 “[Law] aims to 
avoid and to settle disagreements through pre-determined 
procedures. At its most basic level,” Wilkinson observes, “law is 
supposed to provide stability and predictability to society.”13 
Elsewhere he says that law is “society’s roadmap for resolving 
disputes,” and that it “establish[es] . . . rules of the game.”14 In saying 
this, this theory echoes themes running throughout the Legal Process 
school and branches of contemporary analytic jurisprudence.15 
After staking out a claim regarding the function of law, the next 
step is invariably an invocation of the need for the “rule of law.” If 
law is instituted so as to provide a stable and predictable framework 
for social life, then the authority that creates and promulgates the law 
must itself abide by certain procedural limitations or requirements. 
Otherwise, the “function” of law would be negated by the manner in 
which it is drawn up or implemented. Philosophers of law agree that 
the rule of law consists of a constellation of ideal process 
characteristics that all legal codes should strive to attain—these are 
                                                 
12. See generally J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Subjective Art; Objective Law, 
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1663 (2010). 
13. Id. at 1682. 
 14. Id. at 1683; see also id. (“Law is intended to set the standards by which 
people behave, business is conducted, and disputes are resolved.”). 
 15. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1980) 
(representing analytic natural law’s account of law as solution to coordination 
problems); HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (2001) (representing legal 
process view of law as dispute settler); SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011) 
(representing analytic positivism’s account of law as social planner). 
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best understood as limitations upon the State.16 Fuller famously lists 
these “desiderata” as eight: generality, publicity, clarity, consistency, 
feasibility, constancy, prospectivity, and congruence (between de 
jure and de facto).17 Matthew Kramer fleshes them out helpfully:  
1. [Law] operates through general norms;  
2. its norms are promulgated to the people whose conduct is to be 
authoritatively assessed by reference to them;  
3. its norms are prospective rather than retrospective;  
4. the authoritative formulations of its norms are understandable (at least 
by people with juristic expertise) rather than opaquely unintelligible;  
5. its norms are logically consistent with one another, and the obligations 
imposed by those norms can be jointly fulfilled;  
6. its norms do not require things that are starkly beyond the capabilities of 
the people who are subject to the norms;  
7. the contents of its norms, instead of being transformed sweepingly and 
very frequently, remain mostly unchanged for periods of time long enough 
to induce familiarity; and  
8. its norms are generally effectuated in accordance with what they 
prescribe, so that the formulations of the norms (the laws on the books) are 
congruent with the ways in which they are implemented (the laws in 
practice).18 
These desiderata are expected to aid in the maximization of 
law’s coordinating function—they help set up a stable and 
predictable framework for social life.19 In the end, they are also 
supposed to advance the higher order value of freedom.20  
                                                 
 16. Finnis writes that the rule of law is the “name commonly given to the 
state of affairs in which a legal system is legally in good shape.” FINNIS, supra note 
15, at 270. Raz helps to clarify the object of this “rule”: While it is certainly true that 
the plain meaning of “rule of law” suggests that it concerns itself with individual 
conduct, “in political and legal theory it has come to be read in a narrower sense, 
that the government shall be ruled by the law and subject to it.” JOSEPH RAZ, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 212 (1979). What we are 
talking about, then, is some sort of desirable manner in which the creation and 
application of law is undertaken. Id. at 213 (“As we shall see, what the doctrine 
requires is the subjection of particular laws to general, open, and stable ones. It is 
one of the important principles of the doctrine that the making of particular laws 
should be guided by open and relatively stable general rules.”). 
 17. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38-39 (rev. ed. 1969).  
 18. MATTHEW H. KRAMER, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 104 (2007). 
 19. RAZ, supra note 16, at 214-15. 
 20. Id. at 220-21; FINNIS, supra note 15, at 273 (“The fundamental point of 
the desiderata is to secure to the subjects of authority the dignity of self-direction 
and freedom from certain forms of manipulation.”); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE 
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The phrase “rule of law” occurs quite frequently in the anti-
empathy writings, and it is usually linked with freedom. For 
example, a prominent opinion piece written by Professor Steven 
Calabresi ends ominously: “Nothing less than the very idea of liberty 
and the rule of law are at stake in this election. We should not let Mr. 
Obama replace justice with empathy in our nation’s courtrooms.”21 
Similarly, in Herbert Wechsler’s famous article on “neutral 
principles,” he quotes approvingly from Justice Jackson’s The
Supreme Court in the American System of Government: “Liberty is 
not the mere absence of restraint, it is not a spontaneous product of 
majority rule . . . . It is achieved only by a rule of law.”22  
Working within the parameters set down by the rule of law, it 
is expected that representative democracy (which is itself valuable) 
will flourish precisely because of those limits. Law facilitates politics 
and ensures its survival, while politics beneficially softens the 
rigidity of law. Wilkinson writes, “Diversity of experience comes 
from aggregating people’s backgrounds democratically,”23 and 
“America does not need jurists of a modern cast of mind to be a 
modern nation. The great tides of democratic change will see to 
that.”24 Edward Whelan, too, believes that any constitutional theory 
should aim at “protecting the democratic decisionmaking authority 
that the Constitution provides.”25 While “[o]ur legislators will be sure 
to mess up plenty . . . at least citizens will have the ability to 
influence them—and replace them.”26 Robert Bork, too, argues that 
the choice between a judicial oligarchy and an omnipotent 
democracy is a “false statement of alternatives” and that proper 
                                                                                                       
ROAD TO SERFDOM 72 (1944) (“Stripped of all technicalities, this means that 
government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the authority will use 
its coercive powers in given circumstances and to plan one’s individual affairs on 
the basis of this knowledge.”). 
 21. Steven G. Calabresi, Obama’s ‘Redistribution’ Constitution, WALL ST. 
J. (Oct. 28, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB122515067227674187 [https:// 
perma.cc/8M79-98SN]. 
 22. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 
73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 16 (1959) (quoting J. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME 
COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76 (1955)). 
 23. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1679. 
 24. Id. at 1685. 
 25. Edward Whelan, Obama’s Constitution: The Rhetoric and the Reality, 
THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.weeklystandard.com/print/ 
obamas-constitution/article/15945 [https://perma.cc/8LJG-QA2H]. 
 26. Id. 
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constitutional theory can allow for judicially enforced legal 
limitations to coexist with a representative system.27  
While law and politics seem to exist in mutualistic symbiosis, 
this symbiosis paradoxically demands complete separation. Only by 
isolating law from politics are both able to survive without one 
subsuming the other. This antinomy is a constant refrain of the anti-
empathic turn. Wechsler presents them in the starkest contrast: “Is 
there not, in short, a vital difference between legislative freedom to 
appraise the gains and losses in projected measures and the kind of 
principled appraisal, in respect of values that can reasonably be 
asserted to have constitutional dimension, that alone is in the 
province of the courts?”28 Principles are “instrumental” tools in 
politics, and Wechsler accepts this as a reality.29 However, he 
demands that at least in law, principles are intrinsic features.30 
“[P]rinciples,” he writes, “are largely instrumental as they are 
employed in politics, instrumental in relation to results that a 
controlling sentiment demands at any given time,” but courts must 
decide in a manner that is “genuinely principled, resting with respect 
to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and 
reasons quite transcending the immediate result that is achieved.”31 
Bork agrees, stating that “[t]he Court can act as a legal rather than a 
political institution only if it is neutral,” and that law, unlike politics, 
“has a meaning independent of our own desires.”32 A decidedly non-
orthodox legal thinker, Roberto Unger, sums up the position best: 
Doctrine can exist, according to the formalist view, because of a contrast 
between the more determinate rationality of legal analysis and the less 
determinate rationality of ideological contests.  
This thesis can be restated as the belief that lawmaking, guided only by the 
looser and more inconclusive arguments suited to ideological disputes, 
differs fundamentally from law application.33 
Thus, from the standpoint of the judiciary in the context of a 
representative democracy, authority and legitimacy are only granted 
to the adjudicative endeavor when it is apolitical, or purely “legal.” 
                                                 
 27. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 160 (1990). 
 28. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16. 
 29. Id. at 14. 
 30. Id. at 15. 
 31. Id. at 14-15. 
 32. BORK, supra note 27, at 143, 146. 
 33. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 
MOVEMENT 2 (1986). 
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Judges are only authorized to act in a way that is not in some sense in 
direct competition with democracy—in competition with politics—
and this is accomplished by acting only in a logical and rational 
manner. As Fiss writes, “[T]he authority of the judiciary is linked to 
[its] substantive rationality.”34 Wilkinson agrees: “The judge is 
imbued with authority precisely because he is not an aesthete, with 
the idiosyncratic creativity and talent the term implies.”35 
B. Proper Adjudication 
All of these higher order commitments of course have 
implications for adjudication. If law has a function that necessitates 
the procedural limits of the rule of law, then the judge must act in 
such a way that these are not undermined or destroyed.  
The element of the rule of law that is most concerned with 
adjudication is congruence36—that which the legal source specifies 
must actually be made to happen.37 “[T]hose people who have 
authority to make, administer, and apply the rules in an official 
capacity,” Finnis states, “do actually administer the law consistently 
and in accordance with its tenor.”38 Or, as Kramer writes, the “laws 
on the books” must align with the “laws in practice,” and if this 
happens then identical cases will have identical results.39 Because the 
law must also be general in applicability and constant over time, 
though, congruence also results in uniformity. It is this uniformity-
aspect of congruence that is most central to the debate about 
adjudication:40 The law “on the books” should be applied 
                                                 
 34. Owen M. Fiss, Reason in All Its Splendor, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 791 
(1990). 
 35. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684. 
 36. Most of the desiderata involve legislatures. “Consistency” is not about 
consistent application, but consistency or coherence within the code. “Constancy” 
also applies mostly to legislatures, and would only be judicially implicated if a court 
often changed the rules it created. “Congruence” more fully captures the essence of 
the debate about uniform adjudication than do these two, as it deals with application.  
 37. See KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104 (“[I]ts norms are generally 
effectuated in accordance with what they prescribe, so that the formulations of the 
norms (the laws on the books) are congruent with the ways in which they are 
implemented (the laws in practice).”). 
 38. FINNIS, supra note 15, at 270-71. 
 39. KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104. 
 40. Violations of congruence can take place in a variety of ways, but they 
all have this same basic feature. First, it could be the case that a judiciary wholly 
refuses to give effect to an authoritative norm, thus creating no uniformity problem 
but nevertheless eliminating congruence. Beyond this, judges might apply the norm 
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consistently across cases, litigants, time periods, and no matter who 
the judicial officer is.41 
Once it is posited that a requirement of the rule of law is 
uniform adjudication across all axes, the process of adjudication 
becomes further constrained. Preliminarily, even before 
“adjudication” begins, it becomes necessary to limit the sources to 
which the judge can look—he must appeal only to those that are the 
same for all people all of the time.42 There must be some fixed 
source, and for the anti-empathic thinkers this is provided by 
statutory, constitutional, or administrative text, supplemented by 
judicial precedent.  
Here we are at the stage of what Bork calls the “derivation” of 
the principle or rule, and he insists that this must itself be “neutral.”43 
Derivation, then, must come from (1) the rule’s text and (2) its 
original public meaning. As Wilkinson writes, “A judge has no 
sanction to decide other than what a particular text means and 
whether it applies to the situation under consideration.”44 Bork 
provides further elaboration: “[T]he meaning of a rule that judges 
should not change . . . is the meaning understood at the time of the 
law’s enactment.”45 Judges are bound by fixed texts, and the meaning 
of these texts is also fixed. Orin Kerr suggests that even in hard 
cases, the solution is to “read more cases, or read the briefs again.”46 
Nothing beyond these specific legal sources can provide a ground for 
a given outcome—appeals to sources of authority beyond text and 
precedent are examples of what Bork calls illicit “political judging,” 
where the judge “make[s] unguided value judgments.”47  
After deriving a law, a judge must interpret it and apply it. This 
is where the judge must take the authoritative legal source and see 
how it fits with the real world; facts of cases enter, and so too do the 
qualities of individual litigants and issues. Anti-empathy thinkers are 
                                                                                                       
at one time or another, but not always. Finally, we might imagine that there are 
individual judges who themselves are the outliers. The first is a systemic congruence 
problem, which is not at issue in the empathy judging debate. 
 41. KRAMER, supra note 18, at 104. 
 42. BORK, supra note 27, at 146. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1680; see also id. at 1677 (describing “the 
form and structure legal texts provide”). 
 45. BORK, supra note 27, at 144. 
 46. Orin Kerr, Legal Ambiguity, Empathy, and the Role of Judicial Power, 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 13, 2009), http://volokh.com/2009/05/13/legal-
ambiguity-empathy-and-the-role-of-judicial-power/ [https://perma.cc/8U89-HJ92]. 
 47. BORK, supra note 27, at 146. 
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rationalists: They believe that legal sources must be interpreted and 
applied solely using the cognitive faculties of logic and reason.48 
Kerr alludes to this when he describes how “careful judicial 
weighing” of the legally relevant sources will determine an 
outcome,49 as does Wechsler with his “emphasis upon the role of 
reason.”50 Similarly, Wilkinson admonishes judges to look to 
“reason” and “tradition,” and “structure and logic.”51 This is what 
Bork means when he demands “neutrality in the application” of law: 
“[R]easoning and verbal formulations” determine results, and 
adherence to this method is a matter of “intellectual integrity.”52 
Owen Fiss describes this as “Reason in All its Splendor”:  
Given its deliberate character, the judicial decision may be seen as the 
paragon of all rational decisions . . . .  
In calling this process rationalistic, I mean to underscore its discursive 
nature: The justices listen to arguments . . . [and] evaluate the strengths 
and weaknesses of the arguments. Thinking itself is an interiorization of 
the discursive process, a continuation of the argument but now wholly 
within the individual [judge].53 
Formal reason and logic alone control the interpretation and 
application. 
The demand for rationalism follows from the underlying aim of 
the larger theory—rationalism creates uniform and consistent 
adjudication so as to advance the rule of law and law’s stabilizing 
function. Rational interpretation and application advance uniformity 
because reason is assumed to be transitive across and amongst 
individuals. Reason is the same for everyone, and produces the same 
outcomes or reaches the same results no matter the individual 
employing it. Reason is “objective” in this sense, and completely 
“rational” judges would never disagree about anything. If 
adjudication is purely rational, it is expected to be purely uniform.  
The transitivity of rationality is, of course, an assumption, but it 
is crucial to the anti-empathic argument. So too are other 
assumptions. At the most basic level, it must be assumed that people 
are rational more generally (i.e., that human beings are rational 
beings). Furthermore, even if humans are rational and rationality is 
                                                 
 48. Fiss, supra note 34, at 789-90. 
 49. Kerr, supra note 46. 
 50. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16. Of course, he also looks to “principles,” 
but these are themselves rationally derived, no doubt. Id. 
 51. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1665, 1675. 
 52. BORK, supra note 27, at 151 (emphasis added). 
 53. Fiss, supra note 34, at 790. 
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transitive across all individuals, it is still necessary to posit that the 
sources upon which the cognitive faculty of reason must act in 
adjudication are definite or constraining enough to provide reason 
with a clear guide for a uniform outcome. That is, the sources 
themselves must be amenable to rational analysis—they must be 
determinate, or the application of the cognitive faculty will be of no 
avail.  
This is certainly not uncontroversial: The determinacy of law 
has been a source of heated debate in legal theory, but the anti-
empathy thinkers have no such doubts. As Kerr puts it, “[even in the 
hard cases, there is usually one side that emerges as slightly stronger 
than the other.”54 Others, like Wilkinson, have faith that traditional 
tools of interpretation can facilitate the endeavor.55 “But even as to an 
ambiguous text,” he writes, “the judge must use maxims of statutory 
interpretation to determine what others meant. Inclusio unius 
exclusio omnes, for example, ties the hands of a judge both as to 
included and omitted terms.”56 Bork laments not the futility of such 
an endeavor (he finds it both possible and valuable), but instead that 
some “political” judges would deliberately and dishonestly refuse to 
act based on the answers that “legal doctrine” provides: “[I]t is not 
true that all judges choose their results and reason backward. But it is 
true for some judges.”57 And, as he later says, “[L]aw is [not] so 
indeterminate that these results can be reached without straining the 
fabric of legal logic.”58 There is an extant fabric—the problem is 
merely that some adjudicators ignore it.59 
By now, a complete picture of the positive argument of the 
anti-empathic consensus has emerged. Law’s function is to create 
predictability, in turn making freedom and social life possible 
                                                 
 54. Kerr, supra note 46. 
 55. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1680. 
 56. Id. 
 57. BORK, supra note 27, at 70-71. 
 58. Id. at 70. 
 59. Id. It is unclear where Wechsler fits in here, though. He, too, has faith in 
determinacy, although for him this comes not solely from the text and precedent, but 
also his “principles”: “[T]he relative compulsion of the language of the Constitution, 
of history and precedent” can in certain cases (many?) “combine to make an answer 
clear,” and “where they do not,” the “special values” that the Bill of Rights 
provisions “embody” can step in. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 17, 19. Still, there are 
limits to texts. Id. at 19 (“I argue that we should prefer to see the other clauses of the 
Bill of Rights read as an affirmation of the special values they embody rather than as 
statements of a finite rule of law . . . .”). Here, he somewhat departs from his co-
thinkers. 
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simultaneously. This function requires that the law-
making/executing/adjudicating body (the “State”) obey certain 
procedural limitations—the “rule of law”—one aspect of which 
demands that adjudication result in an efficacy that is congruent with 
the legal system’s actually prescribed norms, and, given the 
generality of these norms, it demands uniform results in like cases. 
Uniform adjudication is only possible, though, if the judges are 
required to derive the law from fixed sources, namely, text and 
precedent. Moreover, uniformity is only possible if the interpretation 
and application of those fixed sources is in turn accomplished by 
some stable or predictable human faculty: reason. This keeps the 
judge within the realm of “law” and not “politics.”60 
C. Improper Adjudication 
As its name suggests, the anti-empathic turn consists of more 
than a positive argument. The flipside of the demand for cognitive 
adjudication is a prohibition on the employment of affective 
faculties, including empathy. 
Consider what we described as the first step in adjudication: 
what Bork calls the “derivation” of the legal source.61 In the anti-
empathic argument, this is expected to be the text and its original 
public meaning—something universal, something fixed.62 With 
empathy, though, a new source of “law” is added: the judge’s own 
body of personal experiences and the conscience that is a product of 
that. The problem with this is that it is neither universal nor fixed; it 
is a source of law that varies according to who the judge is, and is not 
shared by others with different experiences. This introduction of an 
individualistic and protean legal source is seen as threatening 
uniformity and predictability. Outcomes are now influenced by 
judicial personality or individuality. 
Kerr warns that, in hard cases, empathy introduces “whatever 
normative vision of the law that the judge happens to like,” and that 
proponents of this method accept that “[the judge] can and should 
pick the side by looking in his heart.”63 The “heart” becomes an 
alternate source of law. Bork argues that the law “has a meaning 
independent of our own desires,” and that the judge may not “make 
                                                 
 60. BORK, supra note 27, at 146. “The Court can act as a legal rather than a 
political institution only if it is neutral,” he writes. Id. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. Kerr, supra note 46. 
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unguided value judgments of his own”—this would be “rule by 
judges according to their own desires,” and not Constitutionalism.64 
Bork’s fears are spoken of in the language of the affective and 
nonrational: Desire supplants law. Whelan speaks of more of the 
same, decrying Obama’s statement that the “critical ingredient” of 
judging in hard cases is what’s in the “judge’s heart”: “No clearer 
prescription for lawless judicial activism is possible.”65 Wechsler 
agrees, writing, “the Court has been decreeing value choices in a way 
that makes it quite impossible to speak of principled 
determinations.”66 
Wilkinson also talks in terms of the emotions as a source of 
law, and not just as a faculty—emotions are creative, and creation is 
nonjudicial. “[J]udges who rely on singular emotion or distinctive 
experience in rendering decisions are planting the seeds of artistic 
creation in terrain where they do not belong,” he argues.67 “In the 
interest of empathy, evolving decency, ethnic identity, or numerous 
whatevers, [judges] exhibit from the bench those striking 
brushstrokes of personal vision,” he writes, “[But] Judges are not 
‘dictators of the case,’ entitled to impose judgment based on their 
impressions or self-expressive concepts of what the outcome should 
be.”68 Emotions are personal, and reflect only the self.  
Wilkinson—more than others—describes why this private 
individuality of emotions is such a bad thing. First, there is the 
familiar counter-majoritarian refrain: Judges are insular “elitist” 
professionals who know little of the life of everyman.69 “The 
individual perspective from the bench is all too often idiosyncratic, 
reflecting a particular upbringing or identity, and the democratic 
process is intended to submerge precisely that.”70 Therefore, “to 
assert that empathy, self-expression, or subjectivity” should be 
employed in judicial decision-making “requires a certain chutzpah, 
whether conscious or not.”71 Beyond this, Wilkinson seems to argue 
that the authority of the judicial office is inherently anti-empathic or 
anti-affective—something probably flowing from the law–politics 
divide: “If a judge . . . views the law as a field for artistic license, 
                                                 
 64. BORK, supra note 27, at 143, 146, 160. 
 65. Whelan, supra note 25. 
 66. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 20. 
 67. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1678. 
 68. Id. at 1685. 
 69. Id. at 1678. 
 70. Id. at 1679. 
 71. Id. at 1678. 
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that individual has abdicated the very power that makes him a 
judge.”72 Fiss, by the way, would agree, writing that “[q]ualifying the 
judiciary’s commitment to reason undermines its authority.”73 
Finally, there comes the central argument—emotions will lead 
to inconsistency and non-uniformity: 
[I]t is inappropriate to institutionalize the emotions of judges . . . . Law is 
supposed to . . . provide a stable foundation upon which society can build 
new structures in accordance with democratic will . . . . Law is useless as a 
stabilizing force if it varies from day to day and from judge to judge. 
Judicial decision making that relies on the artistic virtues comes 
dangerously close to negating law’s distinctive reason for being . . . .74 
These are all the results of allowing adjudicators to appeal to 
affective faculties; these faculties take on the aspects of a new 
“source” of law, and anchoring the legal source to the individual 
judge means that outcomes will not be the same for litigants across 
like cases. The crucial variable becomes the judge himself. 
The anti-empathic movement also believes that empathy (and 
other emotions) can play a pernicious role after the “derivation” 
stage—they can skew the interpretation and application. Even if the 
legal source is not corrupted by an appeal to the judge’s heart, the 
adjudication is still illicit if that heart enters in to interpret and apply 
what is otherwise a clear textual mandate. Here, the outcomes will 
change based on the vagaries of the individual case—there will only 
be consistency with respect to the variables that are determinative for 
the judge’s empathy. Thus, Sotomayor will always vote in favor of 
Latinos, Scalia would always vote in favor of protecting morals 
legislation, etc.—even if the legal source dictates an opposite result. 
Litigants, case type, etc.: All go into what is ultimately a results-
based adjudication.  
This argument comes up most often in anti-empathic writings 
as a plea for “blind justice.” “To the traditional view of justice as a 
blindfolded person weighing legal claims fairly on a scale, [Obama] 
wants to tear the blindfold off, so the judge can rule for the party he 
empathizes with most,” Calabresi writes.75 Wilkinson echoes this: 
“[T]here is an implicit understanding, classically evinced by the 
image of blind justice, that judges are trusted to wield the sword of 
justice dispassionately.”76 In reacting to Obama’s call for empathy, 
                                                 
 72. Id. at 1685.  
 73. Fiss, supra note 34, at 804. 
 74. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1683-84. 
 75. Calabresi, supra note 21. 
 76. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684-85. 
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Whelan writes, “[s]o much for the judicial virtue of dispassion.”77 
Empathy allows for application and interpretation to be influenced or 
determined based on litigant status, and therefore is adjudication by 
“passion.” Empathic adjudication that is also dispassionate is ignored 
as an impossibility or a contradiction in terms. Thus Bork collapses 
empathy into sympathy: “[The Judge] must apply [the law] 
consistently and without regard to his sympathy or lack of sympathy 
with the parties before him,” and it cannot be that “any particular 
group or political position is always entitled to win.”78 Wechsler, 
before all the others, decries results-based adjudication as anti-
judicial and rooted in unprincipled emotional79 biases. In 
constructing his argument for neutral principles, he immediately 
dismisses those who, “vouching no philosophy to warranty, frankly 
or covertly make the test of virtue in interpretation whether its result 
in the immediate decision seems to hinder or advance the interests or 
the values they support.”80 Often this is tied to the type of litigant, 
which is itself an emotional attachment:  
If he may know he disapproves of a decision when all he knows is that it 
has sustained a claim put forward by a labor union or a taxpayer, a Negro 
or a segregationist, a corporation or a Communist—he acquiesces in the 
proposition that a man of different sympathy but equal information may no 
less properly conclude that he approves.81 
If this is allowed, though, adjudicators are not courts of law, but are 
“naked power organ[s].”82 
The anti-empathic thinkers do not do so well at explicating 
precisely why this type of “ad hoc”83 adjudication is antithetical to 
the proper role of a court of law; they think it obvious. What must be 
implied is our familiar consistency or uniformity demand of the rule 
of law. Recall Wilkinson’s plea: “Law is useless as a stabilizing 
force if it varies from day to day and from judge to judge.”84 
This central critique of empathic judging—at the derivation, 
interpretation, and application stages—like the anti-empathic 
thinkers’ positive argument, relies on certain implicit assumptions. 
For one, it must be assumed that the “traditional” or textual legal 
                                                 
 77. Whelan, supra note 25. 
 78. BORK, supra note 27, at 151, 146. 
 79. The cause might also be ideological attachment. 
 80. Wechsler, supra note 22, at 11. 
 81. Id. at 12 (emphasis added). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See id. 
 84. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1684. 
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source must not itself explicitly call for empathy-like adjudication. If 
a statute clearly commanded that it be interpreted and applied 
according to a judge’s “sound discretion” or “in the interests of 
justice,” say, then it would be hard to argue that the rule of law is 
subverted by particularistic, empathic adjudication in that instance. 
More importantly, though, just as the positive argument for 
rational adjudication depends upon what we called the “transitive” 
quality of reason (it is possessed by all judges and produces like 
results in like cases), so too does the critique necessitate a non-
transitive understanding of empathy and affective faculties. It is 
assumed that empathy will not create like results in like cases when 
employed by different judges, probably because of the diversity of 
experiences that the individual judges will have. Thus, Fiss strongly 
criticizes the particularistic bent of the affective faculties: “Often, but 
not always, our passions seem directed toward, or attached to, 
particulars . . . . [Passion] invites a certain partisanship . . . to favor 
one individual or another for purely arbitrary reasons.”85 He also 
thinks that the affective faculties have dark sides—another problem 
that is not shared by rationality: “[J]udges are complicated human 
beings who harbor not only feelings of sympathy, but also feelings of 
fear, contempt and even hate” and an “acknowledgment of the 
multiplicity of passions” means recognition of the fact that “while 
some passions are good, others are quite bad.”86 All this is of course 
problematic, as a court “must concern itself with the fate of millions 
of people.”87 A court’s perspective “must be systematic, not 
anecdotal.”88 
D. Conclusion 
In sum, the anti-empathic turn combines both a positive 
depiction of appropriate adjudication and a critique of emotional, 
empathic influences in the same process. If any affective faculties are 
allowed to enter in, this makes the adjudicator’s “heart” a new source 
from which law is derived. This brings in unauthorized, 
democratically illegitimate, and particularistic—often elitist—
considerations into law, which ought to be common and generally 
                                                 
 85. Fiss, supra note 34, at 799, 801.  
 86. Id. at 800. Of course, the pro-empathy thinkers do not advocate any and 
all emotive responses; Fiss’s concern does go to the larger fear of the anti-empaths, 
though, that emotions cannot be controlled no matter what their nature. 
 87. Id. at 802. 
 88. Id. at 803. 
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shared. Of course, this also brings in a potential for inconsistency, 
given that judges’ experiences and affects will be different. 
Moreover, even in cases where the legal source is unambiguously 
textual or traditional, injecting empathy into the methodology of the 
interpretation and application of that source will still be problematic. 
Here, the particularities of the case, whether they be the nature of the 
issue or of the litigants, will appeal to the judge’s emotional 
attachments and lead to results-based adjudication. Again, non-
uniformity looms over the endeavor. The congruence feature of the 
rule of law is thus undermined by empathic adjudication, as like 
cases will not have similar outcomes—at least not from the point of 
view of the legal system as a whole. Ultimately, this impairs the very 
raison d’être of law itself, which is to create a stable and predictable 
landscape for social living. 
The crux of the anti-empathic consensus, then, seems to be the 
non-transitivity of affects: All empathy is “selective empathy.” The 
affective capacities are categorically incapable of providing a 
uniform or consistent manner of ascertaining legal meaning, and of 
applying it to real life. Because of this, empathic adjudication 
inevitably destabilizes the rule of law by defeating uniformity.  
The non-transitivity of affects, though, is also juxtaposed 
alongside the observation that affective faculties often have a certain 
bias or tilt. This explains why much of anti-empathic thinking 
emphasizes that adjudication incorporating empathy will be 
inherently skewed towards weaker parties. Calabresi attributes the 
following to Obama: “Empathy, not justice, ought to be the mission 
of the federal courts, and the redistribution of wealth should be their 
mantra.”89 He believes that Obama wants judges “to decide cases in 
light of the empathy they ought to feel for the little guy in any 
lawsuit.”90 Bork, quoting a famous law professor, encapsulates the 
purported motto of the Warren court pithily: “[T]he less favored in 
life will be the more favored in law.”91 
Thus, empathy is inherently political in its selectivity and 
variability: It simply chooses a resultant outcome based on value 
choices and instrumentalizes the principles to achieve this result. 
Kerr writes that “emphasizing the need for ‘empathy’ is an invitation 
to replace law with politics,” and Whelan criticizes Obama’s 
philosophy as abandoning “a craft of judging that is distinct from 
                                                 
 89. Calabresi, supra note 21. 
 90. Id. 
 91. BORK, supra note 27, at 70 (citation omitted). 
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politics.”92 As is often the case, those who disagree with this claim 
restate it most clearly and succinctly:  
First, empathy is a species of passion or emotion; it is subjective, variable, 
impervious to evaluation, and too unreliable to be permitted to intrude into 
judicial decision-making. Second, empathy is a quality that singles out the 
powerless and disenfranchised, and is therefore inconsistent with the 
norms of blind, evenhanded justice, which prohibit the singling out of 
particular groups.93 
Or, as Nussbaum summarizes, “[t]he calculating intellect 
claims to be impartial and capable of strict numerical justice, while 
emotions, it alleges, are prejudiced, unduly partial to the close at 
hand.”94 At bottom, then, the anti-empathic argument rests on two 
psychological claims: The affective faculties are (1) non-transitive 
and (2) biased. 
IV. CLASSICAL LEGAL ORTHODOXY 
The anti-empathic consensus is embedded in the contemporary 
intellectual landscape—but where did it come from? As with any 
theory or system of thought, its creation is surely not ex nihilo, and it 
is useful and enlightening to inquire into how similar to or different 
it may be from theories that precede it. The thesis of this Article is 
that the anti-empathic turn is a descendant of Langdellian 
orthodoxy—what some today call “Formalism.” Before a complete 
comparison can be made, the presentation of the progeny must be 
supplemented by that of its progenitor. However, because the earlier 
theory has been discussed and written about exhaustively for almost 
a century, its description will be far shorter than that of the somewhat 
new anti-empathic movement.  
The following Part will describe the central features of 
Langdellianism—what we will call “classical legal orthodoxy.” I say 
“ism,” as this theory will admittedly be an amalgamation, and 
                                                 
 92. Kerr, supra note 46; Whelan, supra note 25. Some anti-empathic 
thinkers are more nuanced and accept the realist thesis that emotions will play a role 
in adjudication, but that they ought not to. See Fiss, supra note 34, at 797. 
 93. Bandes, Moral Imagination in Judging, supra note 8, at 8. 
 94. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION 
AND PUBLIC LIFE 67 (1995); see also id. at 57-58 (“But people in the grip of 
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Emotions, this objector charges, focus on the person’s actual ties or attachments, 
especially to concrete objects or people close to the self.”). 
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perhaps even somewhat of a departure from how Langdell himself 
actually understood law. We are interested not so much in creating 
an accurate intellectual history as in sketching out the generally 
accepted picture of that period. After all, it cannot be Langdell, but 
only Langdellianism that is at work in contemporary times—and this 
incorporates not merely Langdell’s own thoughts, but also the gloss 
put on them by both his disciples and his critics over many years. 
Even caricatures have influence.  
The central idea of classical legal orthodoxy, of this “ism,” is 
that law is a science. The rest of this Part will be an explication of 
that one proposition. 
A. Background and Law as Science 
Classical legal orthodoxy is most associated with its primary 
founder: C.C. Langdell.95 Langdell was Dean of Harvard Law School 
for many decades (starting in 1870), and his tenure there allowed 
him to have a lasting impact on both legal education and legal 
theory.96 He brought the “case method” of teaching law into vogue, 
and aimed to create a science of law by bringing law schools back 
into the fold of modern research universities.97 Because of his 
influence, he has come to represent the entire era of legal orthodoxy: 
The Legal Realists would focus their attacks on him, and he “has 
long been taken as a symbol of the [orthodox] age.”98 
As said above, classical legal orthodoxy understands law to be 
a science. “Law, considered as a science,” Langdell famously writes, 
“consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery 
of these as to be able to apply them with constant facility and 
certainty to the ever-tangled skein of human affairs, is what 
constitutes a true lawyer.”99 The idea of law as science is “the heart” 
of classical legal orthodoxy, and “Langdell believed that through 
scientific methods lawyers could derive correct legal judgments from 
a few fundamental principles and concepts, which it was the task of 
                                                 
 95. GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977). 
 96. Id. 
 97. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 168-70 (1993). 
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 99. C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at 
viii (2d ed. 1879). 
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the scholar-scientist like himself to discover.”100 The creation of this 
idea took place during a time of larger debates about the meaning 
and importance of science to society more generally.101 This science 
was not purely theoretical, like mathematics or logic, but was not 
purely empirical, either, as with biology.102 To understand this, we 
must discuss each step of the “scientific” endeavor in turn. 
B. Induction 
Classical legal orthodoxy begins its “scientific” method by 
inducing higher-order concepts from “empirical” phenomena: 
reported common law cases.103 As Langdell writes, “[the Law] is to 
be traced in the main through a series of cases; and much the shortest 
and best, if not the only way of mastering the doctrine effectually is 
by studying the cases in which it is embodied.”104 Thus, he spoke 
with conviction when identifying the “laboratories . . . [of] the 
chemists and physicists” with “the library” of the law students and 
                                                 
 100. Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983).  
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not that of Gray’s theoretical science. Cases, in Arthur Sutherland’s words, were 
‘specimens’ for classification.”). 
 104. LANGDELL, supra note 99, at vi. 
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professors105—after all, “law is a science, and . . . all the available 
materials of that science are contained in printed books.”106  
This is a strange view of empirical study, though, as Langdell 
thinks that the legal scholar need not induce from all relevant data—
rather, he should cherry pick the “exceedingly small” number of 
“useful and necessary” cases, as the “vast majority [of cases] are 
useless and worse than useless for any purpose of systematic 
study.”107 For this reason, some scholars doubt that the method of 
classical legal orthodoxy is “empirical” at all.108 As Gilmore remarks, 
“the Langdellians . . . performed major surgery on [the law],” and 
“[t]he lack of correspondence between the explicit holdings of 
judicial decisions and the ‘real rules’ that in his view justified the 
results in those cases was one of the most remarkable features of 
Langdell’s doctrinal writing.”109 For our purposes, it is simply worth 
noting that there is at least some empiricism, in that the higher order 
concepts and rules are not merely abstracted from the minds of the 
theorizer.  
It is also worth noting that there is a negative implication in 
Langdell’s statements: Only precedential legal sources may be 
consulted in discerning what the law is, and anything else is 
irrelevant. For example, in criticizing the “mailbox rule” from 
contract law, Langdell admits that it advances “the purposes of 
substantial justice, and the interests of contracting parties as 
understood by themselves,” but concludes that these considerations 
are “irrelevant.”110 This can be called the autonomy of legal 
reasoning—it admits of no supplementation. 
C. Concepts and Rules, and Their Properties 
The expected result of the inductive process is the discovery or 
ascertainment of general legal concepts. As quoted above, Langdell 
describes the science of law as “consist[ing] of certain principles or 
                                                 
 105. Christopher Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 
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doctrines” and notes that there are a finite and discernable number of 
“fundamental legal doctrines.”111 An example of a “concept” or a 
“doctrine” is that of consideration in contract law. Importantly, the 
law contains doctrines and not their justifications (say, efficiency or 
fairness).112 After the concepts are derived, these then produce lower-
order “rules” to be applied in actual cases.113 Thus, the concept of 
consideration in contracts leads to the demand for actual 
communication between the parties, thereby foreclosing the validity 
of the mailbox rule.114 
Implicit in classical legal orthodoxy is that the concepts of the 
law have an order to them. Professor Grey describes this well: “A 
legal system is conceptually ordered . . . [when] a small number of 
relatively abstract principles and concepts . . . form a coherent 
system.”115 Beyond this, the concepts must cover all potential fact 
patterns—the conceptual order must be complete, providing “a 
uniquely correct solution—a ‘right answer’—for every case that can 
arise under it.”116 Gilmore puts it eloquently: The Langdellians 
sought to “reduce an unruly diversity to a manageable unity.”117 
Classical legal orthodoxy thus aspired to both conceptual order and 
completeness.118 
D. Deduction 
Once the legal scientist has completed the “upward” movement 
of induction, the next process similarly mimics natural science—
“downward” deductive application of the rules to actual cases, using 
the tools of logic and reason.119 Scholars now call this a “formal” 
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formal. First, the specific rules were framed in such terms that decisions followed 
from them uncontroversially when they were applied to readily ascertainable facts 
. . . . Second, at the next level up one could derive the rules themselves analytically 
from the principles.” Id. at 11-12; see also Richard H. Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 
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method: “A legal system is formal to the extent that its outcomes are 
dictated by demonstrative (rationally compelling) reasoning.”120 
Describing Langdellianism, Anthony Kronman writes, “[o]nce the 
basic premises of a particular branch of law have been established, 
the remaining task is one of ratiocination only.”121 This, of course, 
means that anyone with reason and logic could do it, without any 
experience to draw upon: “[C]learheadedness is essential and much 
time and patience are required, but experience is equally 
irrelevant.”122 The eminent legal historian Morton Horwitz writes that 
this was an “intellectual system which gave common law rules the 
appearance of being self-contained, apolitical, and inexorable.”123 
Faith in this methodology led Holmes to retort (in his famous 
critique of Langdell), “The life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience.”124 
E. Implications 
The scientific method of law has certain concrete upshots for 
adjudication. The first is determinacy, which flows from the 
conceptual completeness and formalism of the method: If the limited 
number of legal concepts logically produce rules that in turn 
logically apply to all conceivable sets of facts, then there will be no 
hard cases. Every outcome will be dictated from the very beginning: 
“[L]aw meant . . . a scientific system of rules and institutions that 
were complete in that the system made right answers available in all 
cases; formal in that right answers could be derived from the 
autonomous, logical working out of the system.”125 Thus arises the 
caricature of Langdellian orthodoxy as “mechanical 
jurisprudence,”126 and more modern critiques describing it as 
                                                                                                       
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 608 (1999) (“Rules for specific cases were then to be the 
autonomous, worked-out logical entailments of those fundamental principles.”). 
 120. Grey, supra note 100, at 8. 
 121. KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 173. 
 122. Id. at 173-74. 
 123. Morton J. Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 
251, 252 (1975). 
 124. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Book Notices, 14 AM. L. REV. 233, 234 (1880) 
(reviewing C.C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, 
WITH A SUMMARY OF THE TOPICS COVERED BY THE CASES (1879)). 
 125. Pildes, supra note 119, at 608. 
 126. See generally Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. 
REV. 605, 610 (1908). 
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“inexorable” or “inevitab[le].”127 As Grey writes, this is the “promise 
of universal formality—ދevery case an easy case.’ The legal system 
was to be so arranged that it resolved hard disputes by indubitable 
(even if complex) reasoning.”128 Even in cases of first impression, the 
methodology is not stymied: These cases merely call for the 
application of the same deduction to classify the case and infer an 
appropriate rule. “When a new case arose to which no existing rule 
applied,” Grey notes, “it could be categorized and the correct rule for 
it could be inferred by use of the general concepts and principles; the 
rule could then be applied to the facts to dictate the unique correct 
decision in the case.”129 
The flipside of this determinacy results in the second major 
implication of classical legal orthodoxy: Cases can be objectively 
wrong. Judges who reason incorrectly or who are too dimwitted to 
follow the logic to its conclusion will produce results at odds with 
the “real” law. Recall Langdell’s assertion that “[t]he vast majority 
[of cases] are useless and worse than useless for any purpose of 
systematic study.”130 It is the legal scholar’s concepts that are the 
“real” law, and cases either hit or miss that mark. As Grant Gilmore 
writes, “[t]he doctrine tests the cases, not the other way around.”131 
Other implications of the scientific method of classical legal 
orthodoxy are supra-legal. First, it is presumed that such an 
adjudicative theory insulates judging and law from “politics”; by 
anchoring law in pure conceptual order and rational deduction, it is 
separated from the melee of political conflict entirely and is imbued 
with legitimacy and authority. As Grey writes, “the classical 
scientists drew a sharp line between neutral law and partisan politics, 
placing the fundamentals and many of the details of the market and 
private property system on the legal rather than the political side of 
the line.”132 Reason provided its own legitimization of judicial 
authority—reason was objective and apolitical, and “[b]y denying 
                                                 
 127. Horwitz, supra note 123, at 252. 
 128. Grey, supra note 100, at 32. 
 129. Id. at 11; see also KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 174 (“Thus even in cases 
of first impression, Langdell’s method offers a procedure for determining what the 
law is and hence how the case should be decided . . . .”).  
 130. LANGDELL, supra note 99, at vi. 
 131. GILMORE, supra note 95, at 47; see also KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 
182; Patterson, supra note 108, at 201 (“Correct legal principles are discovered not 
in the plethora of decided cases, but in the realm of (ideal) theory. Cases are 
illustrative, not instructive. Cases stand in need of explanation. Doctrine—
explanatory principles—is the (hidden) true legal order.”). 
 132. Grey, supra note 100, at 35. 
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the status of law to any decision that could not be independently 
derived by reason alone, Langdell limited the authority of what is 
actual in the law to what is rational in it.”133 Horwitz too notes that 
scientific legal orthodoxy had this legitimizing effect, but attributes it 
to pro-capitalist motivations: “[T]he paramount social condition that 
is necessary for legal formalism to flourish in a society is for the 
powerful groups in that society to have a great interest in disguising 
and suppressing the inevitably political and redistributive functions 
of law.”134 Professor Rubin sees Langdell’s “mythology” as attractive 
to its climate of opinion because, in the absence of a divine or natural 
law sanction behind adjudication, the common law could take on this 
objective and transcendent justificatory role.135 Reason had these 
properties; one does not need a god if a rational judge is a sufficient 
replacement. 
A second supra-legal implication of the scientific method is its 
expected stabilizing effect of the legal system, in turn allowing for 
more personal freedom. Langdellianism’s appeal, Grey writes, was 
that “[t]he system would be predictable; people could know in which 
circumstances they would get the aid and in which they would face 
the opposition of state power. Further, people would be free from 
public force exerted for the arbitrary personal ends of its 
guardians.”136 He, like Horwitz, also notes the especial affinity that 
commercial interests have for these values—a fact emphasized by 
the Legal Realists’ later critiques.137 
                                                 
 133. KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 182. 
 134. Horwitz, supra note 123, at 264; see also id. at 255 (“The new and 
defensive emphasis in orthodox legal theory on the ‘scientific’ nature of the law 
arose simultaneously as a reaction to the claim of the radical codifiers that the 
common law was political.”). 
 135. Rubin, supra note 103, at 623-24 (“Apart from its philosophical appeal, 
this belief about the common law served the important purpose of political 
justification. Why should judges possess the authority to articulate legal rules that 
the legislature has not enacted? . . . [T]he justification was that underlying principles 
were the essence of the common law, and, that common law judges, in reaching 
their decisions, derived both their authority and their decisional constraints from the 
principles themselves. . . . Common law was thus regarded as containing embedded 
principles reflecting the inherited wisdom of a nation’s legal culture.”). 
 136. Grey, supra note 100, at 32. 
 137. Id. at 33. 
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F. Limits 
One final qualification of classical orthodoxy is required: It 
envisions itself as only applicable in the realm of judge-made, 
private law. As Rubin writes, “Langdell believed that the only real 
law—the only law that merited study as a science—was common 
law.”138 Public law adjudication is really statutory interpretation, and 
is therefore not amenable to induction of concepts. Statutes are but 
the ad hoc emanations of the legislative body, subject to all of its 
whims and caprices, and bearing no factual pattern for analysis nor 
any opinion rationalizing its mandates. “The legal scientists,” Grey 
states, “were . . . not much attracted to the problems of statutory 
interpretation; they believed that the haphazard law laid down in the 
statute books did not lend itself to conceptual ordering.”139 One 
famous Langdellian, Joseph Henry Beale, laments that the 
“haphazard legislation by a legislature [is] chosen not primarily for 
wisdom . . . [and] is not wise enough to foresee its effects other than 
the particular injustice in mind.”140 More to the point, Langdell 
himself simply states that “law” and “legislation” are not 
coterminous.141 
Constitutional law is especially resistant to the scientific 
approach, given its broad language and vague commands. Thus, 
prominent Langdellians resisted the creation of the University of 
Chicago Law School, which had proposed to teach public law as a 
major component of the curriculum.142 As Grey summarizes, 
Constitutional law was unscientific, because hopelessly vague, as typified 
by the police power doctrine; the question whether a statute was 
                                                 
 138. Rubin, supra note 103, at 633. 
 139. Grey, supra note 100, at 34; see id. at 34-35 (“When they did confront 
statutory problems they did not tend to rely on the canon about statutes in derogation 
of the common law. Their formalism rather pointed them toward literal readings that 
avoided both narrowing and expansive purposive interpretation.”). 
 140. Notes by Robert Lee Hale from Jurisprudence Lectures Given by Joseph 
Henry Beale, Harvard Law School, 1909, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 281, 300-01 (1975). 
 141. C.C. Langdell, Dominant Opinions in England During the Nineteenth 
Century in Relation to Legislation as Illustrated by English Legislation, or the 
Absence of It, During That Period, 19 HARV. L. REV. 151, 151 (1906). 
 142. Grey, supra note 100, at 34 (“The classicists did not regard public law, 
including constitutional law, as amendable to scientific study at all. Thus, Langdell’s 
Harvard colleagues and disciples Beale and Ames threatened to withdraw their offer 
to help the new University of Chicago Law School get started, because its organizers 
proposed to teach a substantial number of public law courses, thus violating the 
Harvard curricular dogma that students must be exposed only to scientific ‘pure law’ 
courses.”). 
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“reasonably related to safety, health or morals” could not be treated 
formally. To the legal science mentality such open-ended questions were 
political, not legal, and the courts abandoned any scientific role in trying 
to answer them.143 
Either vagueness or incoherence in a law or legal code makes it 
an intractable subject for classical legal analysis—it makes the task 
of adjudication simply another iteration of the typical political back 
and forth. As Grey writes, Langdellians saw public law “as the 
peripheral and anomalous hybrid of law and politics.”144 Without 
conceptual order that is amenable to formal deduction, legal science 
is a fool’s errand—or so the classical legal thinkers believed.  
G. Summary 
Classical legal orthodoxy begins with the central notion that 
law is science. This means that quasi-empirical analysis leads to 
induction of core concepts (themselves coherently ordered and 
covering the complete universe of possible scenarios), which in turn 
produce lower level rules through deduction. These rules are then 
applied to actual cases, and produce a “correct” outcome every time. 
Induction, deduction, and application are formal: Only logic and 
reason are employed, and these dictate the result autonomously (no 
non-legal sources are needed). This method is expected to result in a 
law that is determinate—outcomes are constrained and pre-ordained 
by reason, and this determinacy enables “law” to be separate from 
“politics,” which in turn ensures the legitimacy of the judiciary and 
the preservation of the rule of law. All this, it is hoped, results in 
greater personal freedom in that it creates a stable framework for 
social living. Finally, because such a theory of adjudication requires 
that it act upon legal sources that are themselves conceptually 
ordered, it cannot work in the area of public law, where sources are 
nothing more than the ad hoc emanations of a legislature. 
V. ANTI-EMPATHIC TURN AS NEO-ORTHODOXY 
Having completed a survey of both the anti-empathic turn and 
classical legal orthodoxy, their substantial similarities seem striking. 
Overall, this reaction to judicial empathy in the 2000s can and should 
be seen as the intellectual descendant of the mode of thinking that 
                                                 
 143. Id. (emphasis added). 
 144. Id. at 48. 
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dominated Harvard around 1900—except for the expected area of 
application. 
A. Comparison 
First, both the anti-empathic turn and classical legal orthodoxy 
seem to agree on the deeper justifications of their adjudicative 
methods: The function of law is to engender stability and 
predictability so that social living and liberty might coexist in a 
complex polity, and the process limitations of the “rule of law” are 
essential to this aspiration. Recall Wilkinson’s discussion of law as a 
“roadmap” and a stabilizing force, along with the frequent 
invocations of the rule of law in anti-empathic writings.145 These can 
be juxtaposed alongside the goals (whether they be cover for ulterior 
motivations or not) of classical legal orthodoxy: The new industrial 
economy needed predictability, but so too do all societies.  
Next, both intellectual movements insist that for the rule of law 
to create its desired effects, “law” must be hermetically sealed from 
“politics.” The anti-empathic thinkers lament the rise of “activist” or 
“political” judging, and believe that only “neutral,” purely rational 
adjudication can preserve space for a robust democracy: The 
counter-majoritarian difficulty is thus solved by rationalism. 
Separation is also needed to protect the rational, neutral law from the 
value conflicts of politics—the dual isolation is mutually beneficial, 
necessary for the survival of each. Similarly, classical legal thinkers 
endeavored to prove that law could be “scientific” and apolitical; 
their method would be so determinate and autonomous that no one 
could challenge the correctness of the outcomes. The anti-empathic 
writers decried “political” judging, while Langdell argued that 
“justice” was irrelevant to adjudication. For both, neutral, 
“scientific” judging grants legitimacy and authority to the judiciary. 
The anti-empathic consensus and classical legal orthodoxy also 
substantially agree with respect to the manner in which the 
“derivation” of the legal source must take place. Both posit that only 
traditional legal sources may provide the start and end points for 
legal reasoning (legal reasoning is autonomous). Thus, Bork 
emphasizes the text of the law and its original meaning, while the 
orthodox thinkers look solely to the isolated world of common law 
precedent. Both theories also seem to think that this relevant universe 
of legal sources can provide answers for any case that might arise—
                                                 
 145. Wilkinson, supra note 12, at 1683. 
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law has completeness. Kerr writes that the solution to hard cases is to 
read the briefs again and think some more, while the Langdellians 
thought that their induced concepts could cover any possible set of 
facts that might arise. 
For both the anti-empathic thinkers and classical legal 
orthodoxy, the law that is derived in such a manner is then 
interpreted and applied formally: Pure logic and rationality dictate 
the process and outcomes. This is perhaps their strongest similarity. 
Reason and logic apply the rules to cases, and the result will be the 
same in like circumstances so long as the methodology is accurately 
employed. Fiss demands “intellectual integrity” through 
“rationalism,”146 while, as Kronman articulates, the orthodox thinkers 
expected to employ “ratiocination only.”147 Bork and Wechsler 
demand “neutral” application of principles, no matter the result, 
while Langdell attacks the mailbox rule despite its substantive justice 
because justice is “irrelevant”—both mean that cold reason should 
determine application and interpretation.148 Of course, empathy or 
any other affective faculty is totally out of place in the endeavor. 
Many of the implications of each theory of adjudication are 
also points of similarity. For example, both believe in the near 
absolute determinacy of the law. Kerr thinks that a “50/50” case will 
be vanishingly rare, and Langdell would deny the possibility at all. 
Determinacy leads to another implication that is shared by both: the 
objective correctness (or not) of case outcomes. Langdellians 
dismissed the “vast majority” of the contracts cases as wrong, while 
Bork and Wechsler lamented “unprincipled” adjudication in Brown 
and Shelley—all of these are simply wrong, and even consistent high 
court holdings on an issue do not settle it as correctly “the law” (say, 
the mailbox rule for Langdell, or affirmative action for Bork).  
In sum, the central lineaments of both the anti-empathic turn 
and classical legal orthodoxy are substantially similar, and the anti-
empathic turn can be accurately described as neo-orthodox legal 
thought. Thus, West’s diagnosis of the roots of the anti-empathic 
consensus requires supplementation. While she sees one “signpost 
along the way”149 as Legal Realism—especially the Holmesian 
aspiration of adjudication guided by modern social science—it may 
be fruitful to also think of the anti-empathic turn as a modern species 
                                                 
 146. See Fiss, supra note 34, at 790. 
 147. See KRONMAN, supra note 97, at 173. 
 148. See BORK, supra note 27, at 146; Wechsler, supra note 22, at 16. 
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of precisely that which Legal Realism opposed: classical legal 
orthodoxy.150 Legal Realists argued that the indeterminacy and 
incompleteness of judicial precedent meant that objective 
adjudication could only be based on some external “science,” and 
thus they turned to the methods of the social sciences, and today, 
economics.151 They sought to replace what they saw as fraudulent 
“legal science” with actual science. I agree that modern anti-
empathic thinkers hearken back to an adjudicative “scientism,” but I 
find that their “science” seems far more like that of Langdell than 
that of Holmes, Llewellyn, or Posner.152 
B. Contrast, Implications 
One major consideration makes the anti-empathic thinkers 
seem like neither Realists nor Langdellians, though: their obsession 
with public law, especially constitutional law. Think of the central 
battlegrounds (and birthplaces) of the anti-empathic consensus—they 
were the confirmation hearings of Supreme Court justices, 
specifically discussing constitutional interpretation. Moreover, Fiss, 
Bork, Wechsler, Whelan, and Calabresi all seem exclusively 
concerned with constitutional adjudication. Recall, though, that the 
classical legal thinkers wanted nothing to do with this area of law; 
the vague and general standards left too much room for judicial 
                                                 
 150. For West’s genealogy, see id. at 274 (“A full history of the emergent 
paradigm of scientific judging is obviously beyond the scope of this discussion, but 
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diametrically opposed in every respect, as they were clearly not. The history of ideas 
and their development is unlikely to preserve something entirely, nor likely to re-
create exact replicas. 
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invention, and smacked more of politics than of “scientific” law. The 
same is mostly true of the modern “law and economics” movement 
West highlights—these scholars and judges rarely aspire to extend 
their analysis beyond the realms of contract, property, and tort 
(traditional private law subjects), and leave the constitutional lawyers 
to their own devices.  
This ties in to a more minor point of contrast: The newer 
thinkers do not cherry-pick cases in the same strange way that 
Langdell does, nor is it clear that they believe that law has 
conceptual order in the same rigorous and uniform way. They 
probably believe in higher level “concepts” (say, Wechsler’s “neutral 
principles,” or the idea of “separation of powers”), but they might be 
speaking only at the level of “rules,” and these may or may not have 
coherence with other concepts or rules. This is an important 
difference, and, after all, how could they demand or expect 
conceptual order given what was just mentioned—their area of 
interest is public law.  
Because of these differences, while West’s juxtaposition of 
Realism, Law & Economics, and the anti-empathic turn seems 
incomplete, so too does our own comparison with classical legal 
orthodoxy. The anti-empathic turn is essentially a neo-orthodox 
movement, but it has transplanted that thought from its expected 
field of application into another one entirely—and one that its 
originators avoided not lazily, but deliberately. The anti-empathic 
turn is public law Langdellianism: something that surely would have 
scandalized the man himself as a contradiction in terms. The source 
of public law (the legislature or the people, and not the judiciary) 
makes it either too haphazard and incoherent, or too vague, to admit 
of formal conceptual order. Thus, public law cannot be determinate, 
and no right or wrong legal answers will flow from a neutral or 
scientific rationalism. With all of this lost, this type of “adjudication” 
(if it can be called that at all) is but another form of politics—no 
necessary right and wrong, just winners and losers. Thus, while the 
anti-empathic thinkers strenuously insist on a separation of law and 
politics, legal science—as understood on its own terms—cannot 
preserve the law and politics divide when applied to the area of most 
interest to them: public law. The anti-empathic consensus demands 
logical-formal reasoning (like classical legal orthodoxy), but unlike 
its progenitor the new theory allows for this reasoning to act upon a 
“law” that has no conceptual order (something orthodoxy would 
have thought was a necessary first principle).  
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The task of this Article was a historical one, and therefore I go 
no further in assessing the possibility or coherence of the anti-
empathic project. John Hasnas writes, “[a]ttributing a naive legal 
formalism to the opponents of judicial empathy and then proceeding 
to demonstrate that legal formalism is untenable tells us nothing 
about the desirability of judicial empathy.”153 This is true, but modern 
critics of judicial empathy should be aware of the intellectual history 
of their theory, and should explain further how their theory can 
synthesize Langdellianism with the adjudication of public law cases.  
CONCLUSION 
The public, politicians, and judges have aligned in opposition 
to judicial empathy. This “anti-empathic turn” has deep intellectual 
roots, and the excavation of those roots is a worthwhile task. While 
some scholars understand the anti-empathy position to be the 
descendant of law and economics, and ultimately Holmesian realism, 
an earlier theory can better explain the source of the current 
consensus. This is classical legal orthodoxy. Both classical legal 
orthodoxy and modern critics of judicial empathy see the ultimate 
function of adjudication to be the preservation of the “rule of law,” 
and accordingly demand a sharp separation of “law” and “politics.” 
Legal sources must be derived, interpreted, and applied employing 
reason and logic alone, and therefore the emotive faculty of empathy 
has no place. For both theories, this adjudicative “science” is 
expected to provide determinacy, and there should never be a hard 
case. Still, the anti-empathy position and classical legal orthodoxy 
differ in one major respect: The latter never expected its “scientific” 
method to be applied to public law (indeed, they saw this as not 
“law” at all), while the former almost exclusively focuses on this 
area (normally constitutional law).  
The anti-empathic consensus, then, is a product of classical 
legal orthodoxy but also a mutation—one that the older theory would 
not have approved. The new consensus takes the formalistic method 
of its progenitor, but, unlike that older theory, does not demand that 
the body of law upon which the method acts be conceptual ordered.  
Given that this debate is likely to resurface very soon in the 
impending confirmation hearings of any new Supreme Court justice, 
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we would do well to think of the intellectual pedigree of each 
position, taking note of weaknesses long recognized in older 
theories, thereby approaching any categorical approval or 
disapproval with the requisite awareness. To understand the debate, 
we should understand its context. 
